Automatable Inference: Resolution

Motivation and Outline

Non-clausal inference seems daunting. Due to work of Robinson, we have RTP (Resolution Theorem Proving) as a computationally-possible semi-decidable, complete, sound system (ideas by Herbrand in the proof).

After conversion to CNF, FOPC clauses look almost exactly like PC clauses with variables and functions and predicates. Thus resolution is very close to what we've seen. The main technical issue is the matching of "cancelling" clauses, via the unification we learned for Prolog, so really this material is mostly familiar.

The two main techniques are resolution and unification, at least the second of which we know from Prolog. Coming up:

More Details

FOPC Inference PowerPoint , Courtesy of Hwee Tou Ng (Nat. U. Singapore).

John Alan Robinson and Resolution


Robinson

"Robinson was born in Yorkshire, England in 1930 and left for the United States in 1952 with a classics degree from Cambridge University. He studied philosophy at the University of Oregon before moving to Princeton University where he received his PhD in philosophy in 1956. He then worked at Du Pont as an operations research analyst, where he learned programming and taught himself mathematics. He moved to Rice University in 1961, spending his summers as a visiting researcher at the Argonne National Laboratory's Applied Mathematics Division. He moved to Syracuse University as Distinguished Professor of Logic and Computer Science in 1967 and became professor emeritus in 1993."

--Wikipedia

Resolution

Resolution Rule

The scan below shows how Resolution is closely related to the true inference rule (mislabeled here) of "transitivity of implication").

Thus "unit" resolution produces a new clause with one less term than its longer parent. As we have seen, it's clostly related to modus ponens.

Modus Ponens:
(A ⇒ B), A
-----------------
B

Resolution:
(∼ A ∨ B), A
-----------------
B

Procedure

Resolution in Predicate Logic E.g. 1

Resolution in Predicate Logic E.g. 2

Given
1. ∼ R
2. ∼ (P ∧ ∼ Q)
3. ∼ P → (R ∧ S)

Prove 4. Q by resolution.

Clauses: 1 → ∼ R (C1) 2 → ∼ P ∨ Q (C2) 3 → P ∨ R (C3a)       P ∨ S (C3b) 3 → ∼ Q (C4)

Resolutions: C1, C3a → P (C5) C5, C2 → Q (C6) C4, C6 → ∅ (null, 'box')

Resolution in First-Order Logic

To generalize to FOL from PC must account for

Ans. First convert to CNF, then unify variables, then apply resolution.

Resolution Rule

Resolution in FOL E.g. 1

Resolution is only defined between clauses. Conversion algorithm from non-clausal form to CNF coming up soon. \ is the substitution operator and the substitution set in {curly brackets} is the most general unifier of the two clauses.

at-home(x) ∨ at-work(x) , ∼ at-home(Mary) unified by {x\Mary} at-work(Mary) Parent(x,y) → Older(x,y), ∼ Parent(Lulu, Fifi) {x\Lulu, y\Fifi} Older(Lulu, Fifi) Loves(x, Mother-of(x)) ∨ Psycho(x), ∼ Loves(Bill, y) ∨ Sends-flowers(Bill, y) {x\Bill, y\Mother-of(Bill)} Psycho(Bill) ∨ Sends-flowers(Bill, Mother-of(Bill))

Resolution in FOL E.g. 2

Simple proof from English:

If something is intelligent (I) it has common sense (H)
Deep Blue does not have common sense
Thus Deep Blue (D) is not intelligent.
Clauses: 1. ∀ x.I(x) → H(x) → ∼ I(x) ∨ H(x) (C1) 2. ∼ H(D) → ∼ H(D) (C2) 3. ∼ I(D) → I(D) (C3), deny conclusion Inference C1, C2 {x\D} ∼ I(D) (C4) -- C3, C4 ∅ Alternate notation: % specifying literal id's the variable r[C1b ('2nd literal, Clause 1), C2] r[C3, C4]

One more time

Simple Unification Egs.

The Unification Algorithm

The substitutions ( e.g. {x\D}) unify the clauses, that is, they become perfect matches. If such unification is not possible, resolution cannot be applied. We're quite familiar with unification (two-way matching) in Prolog: the = operator.

The unification algorithm recursively compares the structures of the clauses to be matched, working across element by element. Matching individuals, functions, and predicates must have the same names, matching functions and predicates must have the same number of arguments, and all bindings of variables to values must be consistent throughout the whole match.

We know how to unifiy, if only because these problems are naturals on exams. E.g.
Unify
(L(x,y, f(A,y), D) with
(L(z, C, f(w ,u), v), (variables in lower-, constants in upper-case. That's normal in the literature, but recall Prolog's capitalization rules for funcs, vars and consts are opposite, so if we wanted to check the above we'd see l(X,Y, f(a, Y), d) = l(Z,c,f(W,U),V). X = Z, Y = c, W = a, U = c, V = d.

Typical Problem (Len Schubert)

P(s, G(s), t, H(s,t), u, K(s,t,u)) ∼ P(v, w, M(w), x, N(w,x), y) % the ∼ is sign we want to % unify so as to resolve

Resolution Proof in FOL E.g. 3

Resolution Proof in FOL E.g. 3

Different Notation

I count three resolutions...

Clause form in FOL 1

Clause form in FOL 2

Clause Form Conversion E.g.

EXISTENTIAL ELIMINATION: SKOLEMIZATION

Existential Quantification asserts at least one individual exists that satisfies the predicate. The trick is just to make up a name for that individual and keep track of him like any other individual. If someone asks ``who is that?'', the answer is ``the one who exists according to the Existentially Quantified statement.''

∃ x (P(x)) → P(Jerry)
This Skolem constant idea also works for ∃ acting over ∀ .
∃ x ∀ y (P(x,y)) → ∀ y P(Fred,y)
Extending the idea to a Skolem function deals with cases of ∀ acting over ∃, in which case the particular individual who exists depends on just who gets instantiated in the "forall"

E.g. "Everyone has a biological father" needs a Skolem function to assure that the father making the sentence true depends on who gets substituted in for 'Everyone': Bob's father may not be Alice's.
∀ x ∃ y (Father(y,x)) →
∀ x Father(father-of(x), x)
Note that such a function has to exist because it is guaranteed by the ∃ in the premise. However we may have no idea what any of its values are (do I know your father?).

Clause form in FOL E.g. 1

Misprint in 1st line. ¬P(G) should be ¬P(x)

Clause form in FOL E.g. 2

FOPC PROOF EXAMPLE

We may have seen this example proved by forward and backward chaining earlier...

The law says that it is a crime for an American to sell weapons to hostile nations. The country Nono, an enemy of America, has some missles, and all of its missles were sold to it by Colonel West, who is an American.

To Prove: West is a criminal.

FORMALIZE

``it is a crime for an American to sell weapons to hostile nations.''
American(x) ∧ Weapon(y) ∧ Sells (x,y,z) ∧ Hostile(z) → Criminal(x).

``Nono... has some missles''
∃ x. Owns(Nono,x) ∧ Missle(x): by EElim to:
Owns(Nono, M1)
Missle(M1)

`` all of its missles were sold to it by Colonel West''
Missle(x) ∧ Owns(Nono,x) → Sells(West, x,Nono)

``West, who is American...''
American(West)

``The country Nono, an enemy of America''
Enemy(Nono, America)

FORMALIZE, CONT.

As is usual, to understand the story or do the proof we need to know extra taken-for-granted facts. Missles are weapons
Missle(x) → Weapon(x)

Enemies count as hostile:
Enemy(x, America) → Hostile(x)

This knowledge base contains no functions --- this makes inference easier. It's also all Horn clauses. Nine resolutions are needed... pretty big binary tree.

Question-Answering and Negation of Conclusion

Back in Proof E.g. 3, imagine we wanted to prove "Something is older than Fifi". That is
∃ x.Older(x,Fifi).
Denial: ∼ ∃ x.Older(x,Fifi), or
∀ x. ∼ Older(x,Fifi).
In clause form: ∼ Older(x,Fifi).

Now the last step in that proof would have been: Older(Lulu,Fifi), ∼ Older(x,Fifi) {x\Lulu} ∅ So yes, something is older, and if we keep track of substitutions as in question-answering mode, it's Lulu.

BUT! Don't make the mistake of first forming the clause from the conclusion and then denying it!.
Conclusion: ∃ x.Older(x,Fifi).
Clause form: Older(C, Fifi)
Denial: ∼ Older(C, Fifi)
This last clause will NOT UNIFY with Older(Lulu,Fifi)!

RTP Recap

Question-Answering 1

Question-Answering E.g.

Question-Answering 2 (mostly Len Schubert)

Yes-No Questions: Make "parallel" attempts to prove or disprove the proposition: If P? is the proposition, refuting
¬ P means "Yes" and refuting P means "No".

Answer Extraction: With "Wh- questions" (or "fill in the blank" questions), method is to tack ∨ Ans(x) onto the denial, where x is the variable whose instantiation answers the "question" (usually the assertion "There is an x such that it's an answer"). Then try to derive
∅ ∨ Ans(my_answer).

Planning: We can also see that a plan for a sequence of actions can be formalized in FOL, and then we can assert "you can't get to the goal from this initial state". The contradiction to that is a set of bindings, as in question answering, that show how you can achieve the goal from your starting state. Of course, need to represent time somehow.

Answer Extraction Example

Carol's wherever Bob is. Bob's at the dance. Where's Carol?

Formalize:
1. ∀ x.At(Bob,x) → At(Carol,x) 2. At(Bob, Dance) ∃ x. At(Carol,x)       % "Question": Carol's at x for some x ∼ ∃ x. At(Carol,x) % Denial. Eliminate ∃: 3. ∀ x. ∼ At(Carol,x) % Denial

Clauses, Refutation and Answer Extraction C1. ∼ At(Bob,x) ∨ At(Carol,x) % from 1. C2. At(Bob, Dance) % ≡ 2. C3. ∼ At(Carol,x) ∨ Ans(x)       % Denial + Extraction Clause C4. At(Carol, Dance) % r[C1, C2] C5. ∅ ∨ Ans(Dance) % r[C3, C4]

"Good" and "Bad" True Answers

Everyone works for someone. Bob works for Carol. Who does Bob work for?

Formalize:
1. ∀ x ∃ y.Works-for(x,y) 2. Works-for(Bob,Carol) Q: ∃ x.Works-for(Bob,x) Denial: ∀ x. ∼ Works-for(Bob,x)

First Proof: C1. Works-for (x, employer-of(X))       % from 1., with Skolem function C2. Works-for(Bob,Carol) % ≡ 2 C3. ∼ Works-for(Bob,x) ∨ Ans(x) % Denial + Ans. Ext C4. ∅ ∨ Ans(employer-of(Bob)) % r[C1, C3] Nothing wrong with this, but may be considered less satisfactory than

Second Proof: C4' ∅ ∨ Ans(Carol) % r[C2, C3]

Don't need semantics to see it's probably a good idea to try to get Skolem-free answers by preferring inferences that don't substitute Skolem constants of functions into the answer. Sometimes not possible of course.

Getting Multiple Answers

Probably easiest way to imagine how to do this is Prolog's backtracking algorithm: ; causes a fake fail, which forces backtracking to see if there is another instantiation that yields another answer.

Resolution Strategies

Problem: what resolutions to do? Easy to flail around with rewriting rules: algebraic "simplification" has rules like
A+0 = A , as well as "+ is commutative", so LOTS of useless or harmful choices! Further, every resolution makes KB larger: all clauses are true and none goes away (in 'monotonic logic', which we're talking about).

Given we've known what to do since 1965, HOW to do it is still a research issue, like AI in general (by definition). Some ideas...

Two More Strategies

Extending FOL 1: Factoring

Suppose we have this KB: 1. P(x,y) ∨ P(u,v) 2. (∼ P(s,t)) ∨ (∼ P(w,z)) Clearly 1. asserts the same thing twice, and 2. asserts its opposite twice. Must have a contradiction, so should be able to derive ∅. BUT... resolve the two clauses, say with {x\s, y\t}, and we get P(u,v) ∨ ∼ P(w,z), which is obviously TRUE. Oops. So we need yet another inference rule: FOL factoring.

Typical Factoring Example (Len Schubert)

P(y,x,A) ∨ P(F(y),z,z) ∨ P(F(A),B,x)

Extending FOL 2: Using Equality

FOL not "equality friendly", so a raft of techniques, usually with "modulation" in their name for some reason, are tacked on.

Extending FOL 3, 4: Modal and Non-Monotonic Logics

Problem 1:
1. I believe I'm seeing the morning star (which BTW is usually Venus).
2. It's true whether I know it or not that this month the morning star is Mercury.
3. Thus I must believe I'm seeing Mercury. (with usual "equality" axioms as above.)

That's just not true. We need "modal" logical operators that are axiom sets designed to deal with the elusive nature of belief (and lots of other phenomena). Nixon the war-monger was a Quaker, for instance: people are quite comfy living with totally incompatible beliefs. As the Red Queen says: " Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."

Problem 2:
I head out CSB to the airport and it turns out the Elmwood St. Bridge is closed. I'm surprised and discombobulated: It seems I had assumed something that wasn't true. In FOL we don't have assumptions, or any sort of "mistaken fact", but in real life we need them.

We'd like to "take back" "wrong facts" and their related conclusions, and re-reason. FOL as we know it is monotonic (KB is true, all facts inferred from it are entailed by it, period!). So we need a non-monotonic logic, and this brings up cool ideas like default logic, which can use "default fact" that all birds fly, but lets us deal with the fact that Tweety (the bird) doesn't fly once we're told she's a penguin. A related complex technique in logic, not so cool IMO, is circumscription.

In the world of AI Planning, this sort of thing is easily implemented with a different inference and knowledge-representation system (early, canonical STRIPS system). Sussman invented the Scheme language largely to get its "continuation" mechanism. He then wrote CONNIVER (thesis), a successor to Hewitt's PLANNER (thesis), to allow 'teleporting' out of states that are found to be based on bad facts and full of false conclusions, over to other lines of reasoning free of those mistakes. BTW, PLANNER pretty much introduced today's idea of methods, calling them "actors".